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Individual Differences and Stability of Dynamics among Self-Concept Clarity, Impatience, 
and Negative Affect 
Self-concept clarity (SCC) is associated with behavioral and emotion regulation, although 
the nature of this link is unclear. SCC may serve as a self-regulatory resource, or it may 
be a product of well-regulated behaviors and emotions. In two studies using experience 
sampling among undergraduates (n = 46 and n = 36), we investigate whether models 
representing relationships among SCC, impatience, and negative affect (NA) states 
conform to these theories, are similar across individuals, and are stable across a one-
month period. Results reveal substantial variation between persons in these dynamic 
relationships, suggesting that multiple SCC-relevant regulatory processes exist. These 
patterns were not stable from one month to the next, but changes in them related to 
changes in stress, suggesting higher-order regulation of these dynamics.  
 





Self-concept clarity (SCC; Campbell et al., 1996), defined as the clarity, consistency, and 
stability of an individual’s self-concept, seems to play an important role in normal personality 
functioning, particularly in the domains of self-regulation and emotion regulation. Research has 
shown, for example, that SCC correlates positively with conscientiousness (Campbell et al., 
1996; Fite et al., 2017) and negatively with impulsivity (Campbell et al., 1996; Ellison & Levy, 
2012; Matto & Realo, 2001). SCC also negatively predicts compulsive internet use (Israelashvili, 
Kim, and Bukobza, 2012; Quinones & Kakabadse, 2015) and relates negatively to maladaptive 
coping behaviors such as procrastination (Petrie, 2014), denial, behavioral disengagement, and 
emotional disengagement (Smith, Wethington, & Zhan, 1996). In addition, SCC relates 
negatively to emotion dysregulation variables, including negative affect (Bond, Ruaro, & 
Wingrove, 2006; Campbell et al., 1996; Lear & Pepper 2016; Lee-Flynn, Pomaki, DeLongis, 
Biesanz, & Puterman, 2011; Nezlek & Plesko, 2001; Scala et al., 2018), depression (Bobrowski, 
DeMarree, Lodi-Smith, & Naragon-Gainmey, 2018; Campbell et al., 1996; Chang, 2001; Lee-
Flynn et al, 2011), and feelings of tenseness, boredom, and dejection in the context of goal 
pursuit (Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000). Thus, SCC seems to have 
broad connections to adaptive self-regulation, especially in the domains of effortful self-control 
and emotion regulation. 
However, the majority of prior research linking SCC with behavioral and emotion 
regulation is cross-sectional, focusing on trait SCC and how it relates to individual differences in 
these other variables. Despite its original conceptualization as an individual-differences variable, 
self-concept clarity has been shown to vary in a state-like way across time within individuals, 
and this variation has important consequences (Ayduk, Gyurak, & Luerssen, 2009; Nezlek & 
Plesko, 2001; Scala et al., 2018; Schwartz et al., 2011). For example, Ayduk and colleagues 
(2009) showed that daily depression scores and relationship conflict relate to daily levels of 
SCC, and Nezlek and Plesko (2001) found similar relations among daily SCC, daily negative 
affect, and daily stressful events. At an even more fine-grained timescale, Scala and colleagues 
(2018) found that the link between state negative affect and subsequent self-injury urges in an 
outpatient clinical sample was only present when state SCC was low. Thus, self-concept clarity 
exhibits short-term intraindividual variability, which in turn relates to intraindividual variability 
in important emotional and behavioral outcomes, suggesting that SCC has a dynamic (instead of 
solely dispositional) relation to self-regulatory processes.  
At least two compelling general theories regarding the short-term, dynamic relationships 
between self-concept clarity and self-regulatory variables can be derived from the literature. One 
possibility, consistent with the original theory of SCC (Campbell et al., 1996), is that self-
concept clarity functions as a resource, enabling the adaptive regulation of behaviors and affects 
by allowing the individual to draw upon values, goals, and self-regulatory capacities effectively, 
especially when faced with adverse events (Light, 2017). This theory is supported by evidence 
that SCC mediates the link between stressful life events and subjective well-being (Ritchie, 
Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Gidron, 2011), that state SCC levels moderate the link between 
state negative affect and urges to self-injure (Scala et al., 2018), and that increases in self-
certainty predict increases in positive affect (Baumgardner, 1990). Likewise, SCC increases 
produce greater relationship satisfaction (Lewandowski, Nardone, & Raines, 2010) while 
decreases in SCC predict internalizing symptoms (van Dijk et al., 2014). At the state level, 
according to this theory, increases in state SCC would precede euthymia and well-regulated 
behaviors, reflecting the individual’s current level of SCC “resources.”  
A second possibility, derived from the observation that self-concept is in part constructed 
from dynamic self-perceptual processes (Bem, 1967; Hertel, 2017; McConnell, Rydell, & 
Leibold, 2002; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995), is that SCC is the outcome of one’s own self-
concept-congruent emotional and behavioral experiences. That is, individuals experience a 
clearly defined self-concept (i.e., high state SCC) when their recent behaviors and internal 
experiences match this self-concept. Several experimental studies provide support for this notion. 
For example, forgiving an undeserving other decreases self-concept clarity (Luchies, Finkel, 
McNulty, & Kumashiro, 2010), whereas engaging in a self-confirmation exercise after a threat to 
the self-concept raises SCC (Slotter & Gardner, 2014). Even engaging in self-reflection changes 
SCC, but in different directions, depending on whether the individual’s SCC level was high or 
low in the first place (Csank & Conway, 2004). Thus, the notion that SCC changes in the short 
term as a result of self-relevant experiences has support as well. At the state level, this theory 
would predict that changes in emotional states and behaviors would precede, not follow, changes 
in state SCC. 
However, these two theories are also not mutually exclusive. It is possible, for example, 
that SCC state is influenced by the regularity of an individual’s emotions and behaviors, while at 
the same time serving as a resource for further emotion and behavior regulation, as in a positive 
feedback loop. Recently, Wong and Vallacher (2017) investigated this general question using 
daily diary data and cross-lagged multilevel structural equation modeling. They found, on 
average, a reciprocal relationship between SCC and grit, such that SCC predicted grit two days 
later, and grit predicted SCC across the same interval. This suggests that a positive feedback loop 
does indeed describe the average connection between these two variables. However, there was a 
fairly high degree of random variance around these parameters, reflecting differences among 
individuals in the lagged SCC-grit relationship.  
This highlights the possibility that self-concept clarity might function differently in 
different individuals (and thus that these two hypotheses are both correct, but for different 
people). For example, one person’s SCC state may depend on the regularity of emotions and 
experiences congruent with their self-concept, while another’s SCC state may function as a 
resource that helps the person regulate their emotions and behaviors. This situation might cause 
the appearance of a feedback loop in group-level analyses (including multilevel modeling), even 
if this reciprocal process does not exist within any individual. Uncovering processes that hold 
within the individual requires a person-specific analytic method, which allows for qualitative 
(not only quantitative) variation among individuals (Hamaker & Wichers, 2017).   
In the current series of studies, we use a high-frequency experience sampling method 
(ESM) paradigm and dynamic factor analysis (DFA), a form of within-person modeling, to 
conduct a preliminary examination of the extent of heterogeneity in dynamic models of SCC and 
self- and emotion regulation, using the variables of SCC and impatience (Study 1) and SCC, 
impatience, and negative affect (Study 2). We use an undergraduate sample, which affords an 
opportunity to study a population who are negotiating new social roles and having new 
experiences and for whom the dynamics of SCC may thus be particularly important (Lodi-Smith 
& Crocetti, 2017). We investigate the extent to which dynamic factor models conform to the 
above theories of the dynamics between state SCC and these correlates and the extent to which 
they differ between individuals. In addition, in Study 2 we utilize a “measurement burst” design 
to investigate whether these models are stable across a one-month period within individuals. 
Study 1 
The aims of Study 1 were to establish survey items that are suitable for measuring state self-
concept clarity and a putatively related self-regulation variable (impulsivity) in a high-intensity 
ESM format and to investigate the heterogeneity of within-subject process models for these 
constructs across individuals. As above, impulsivity and similar constructs (such as 
conscientiousness) have a robust relation with SCC in cross-sectional analyses (Campbell et al., 
1996; Fite et al., 2017; Matto & Realo, 2001), but to date the connection of state impulsivity with 
state SCC has not been examined.   
Method 
Participants and procedure 
Participants were 46 undergraduate students at a small university in the Southwestern U.S., who 
were recruited by email, on a random basis, from an introductory psychology class. They were 
offered course credit for their participation in a study involving “repeated surveys on a 
smartphone.” Participants attended a 10-minute laboratory visit to complete a baseline 
demographics questionnaire, receive instructions for completing mobile surveys, and pick a 
schedule for mobile survey completion. For the ESM portion of the study, participants were 
asked to complete a survey on 64 occasions using the web browser of their smartphone and 
Qualtrics online survey software. They selected one of three schedule types, according to their 
preference: a survey every 15 minutes for two days (one eight-hour series per day); a survey 
every 15 minutes for four days (one four-hour series per day); or a survey every 30 minutes for 
four days (one eight-hour series per day). A timer application provided auditory prompts for 
survey completion. Participants could select when to start a series of surveys, but they were 
asked to complete survey series on days when they would be able to do so without interruption 
(e.g., from classes, sporting events, or travel) but which were otherwise representative of their 
everyday life (in order to maximize the relevance of collected data). 
Seventy-five individuals (Mage = 19.3, age range = 18-23 years) enrolled in the study. Of 
these, 51 (68%) were women and 24 were men. Fifty-four (72%) reported their race as White, 16 
(21%) as Asian/Pacific Islander, one (1.3%) as Black, and nine (12%) as more than one race 
(participants could also select multiple categories). Eighteen (24%) identified their ethnicity as 
Hispanic/Latino. Sixty-three individuals of the 75 began returning mobile surveys. Fifteen of 
these participants did not return enough surveys for their results to be usable (e.g., they 
completed only one day of surveys instead of the required two). Of the remaining 48 
participants, two participants returned excessively stereotyped data (e.g., all zeroes). The 
remaining 46 individuals constituted the study sample and provided, in aggregate, 2,935 surveys. 
None of the measured demographic variables (age, gender, race, or ethnicity) related to attrition 
between enrollment and completion of surveys (p’s > 0.3). Among the participants who began 
returning surveys, the mean number of surveys returned was 57.6 out of 64 (90%), and the 
median number of surveys returned was 64. Forty-three of these individuals (93%) elected to 
return surveys every 15 minutes, and the remaining three participants chose to space their 
surveys 30 minutes apart. 
Measurement items 
Each mobile survey consisted of six items, each of which was rated on a visual analog scale 
using a sliding response bar and the phone’s touchscreen. Impulsivity was measured using the 
Momentary Impulsivity Scale (MIS; Tomko et al., 2014), a four-item questionnaire designed as a 
measure of impulsivity in ESM studies. Self-concept clarity was measured using two items 
adapted from a prior study of self-concept clarity using ESM (“Since the last prompt, I felt like I 
had a clear sense of who I am and what I want in life”; and “Since the last prompt, I felt that I am 
not really the person that I appear to be”; Ayduk, Gyurak, & Luerssen, 2009). Responses were 
coded using a 0-100 scale with anchors at 0 (“Very slightly or not at all” for the MIS items, and 
“Not at all” for the SCC items) and 100 (“Extremely” for all items). 
Power 
Statistical power in DFA increases with the number of occasions, not the number of individuals 
(because each analysis pertains to only one person). There are no clear guidelines for the number 
of occasions recommended (Ram, Brose, & Molenaar, 2013), in part because this number may 
differ depending on whether the desired result is model convergence, detection of model misfit, or 
accurate estimation of individual model parameters. We therefore chose a target of 64 occasions 
to approximate recent empirical studies of psychological data using dynamic factor models of 
similar size (e.g., Fisher, 2015) while attempting to minimize participant burden. 
Data preparation and analytic strategy 
Examination of the data suggested that responses to three of the MIS items (“Since the last 
prompt, I said things without thinking,” “Since the last prompt, I spent more money than I meant 
to,” and “Since the last prompt, I made a spur of the moment decision”) did not show sufficient 
variability to be used in analyses for most participants. That is, the values for these items across 
participants were zero-inflated and extremely skewed, presumably reflecting the low rate of 
these behaviors within any given 15- or 30-minute period among undergraduates. Although there 
is no consensus threshold for how much intraindividual variability DFA requires (Ram, Brose, & 
Molenaar, 2013), we disregarded these items as unrepresentative of momentary impulsivity in 
our sample. However, the remaining MIS item (“Since the last prompt, I have felt impatient”), 
did vary adequately and normally for each participant.  
In addition, the two self-concept clarity items showed a very weak average intra-
individual correlation (r = -.09). The second of these (“Since the last prompt, I felt that I am not 
really the person that I appear to be”) had inadequate variability for roughly one-sixth of the 
sample, and informal feedback from participants suggested that the meaning of this item was not 
always clear. For these reasons, we chose to focus analyses on the positively worded SCC item 
(“Since the last prompt, I felt like I had a clear sense of who I am and what I want in life.”).  
The analyses considered here require data with equal intervals between measurement 
occasions (Molenaar & Rovine, 2011). However, participants did not always respond to prompts 
exactly as they occurred, violating this assumption. Thus, we used cubic spline interpolation 
(Forsythe, Malcolm, & Moler, 1977) with the “spline” function in R software to re-sample 
evenly-spaced data points for the current analyses. This approach fits curves to the observed time 
series (separately for each variable, day, and individual) and then re-samples from the curves to 
create time series with equal intervals between observations. In a previous paper using 
experience sampling, cubic spline interpolation was shown to produce model parameters that 
closely corresponded to those describing the original data (Fisher, Reeves, Lawyer, Medaglia, & 
Rubel, 2017).  
Model fitting was conducted with LISREL, version 8.12 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). An 
autoregressive (AR) model with a lag of 1 occasion, in which each variable was regressed on 
itself at the prior occasion and allowed to correlate with the other variable at the same occasion, 
was used as the baseline model for each participant. If this model did not show good fit to the 
data, modification indices guided the sequential addition of cross-lagged regression parameters 
between one variable at time t – 1 and another variable at time t until satisfactory fit was 
achieved. Fit decisions were based on cutoffs (Hu & Bentler, 1999) on the Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR; value ≤ 0.1), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA; value ≤ 0.08), the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; value ≥ 0.95), and the Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI; value ≥ 0.95). 
Results and Discussion 
In the ESM surveys, SCC showed a mean value of 46.6, whereas impatience values had a mean 
of 29.1. SCC showed a stronger degree of interindividual (between-subject) variability than 
impatience (SDSCC = 27.2, SDimpatience = 18.9), consistent with the notion that SCC varies in a 
more trait-like way than impatience does. On the other hand, both SCC and impatience showed a 
considerable degree of intraindividual (within-subject) variability (SDSCC = 14.8, SDimpatience = 
19.8) as well, suggesting a component of state-like variability for each item.  
In dynamic factor analyses, a multivariate AR model, in which levels of SCC and 
impatience at one time point predicted themselves at the next time point, provided good fit for 26 
of the 46 individuals in the sample. For the remaining 20, this model did not show sufficient fit. 
For nine individuals, modification indices suggested regressing SCC at time t onto impatience at 
time t – 1, after which the model showed good to excellent fit. For an additional two participants, 
this model only showed approximate fit. In contrast, for six different participants, modification 
indices suggested instead that the opposite-direction cross-lagged parameter be added (with 
impatience at t regressed onto SCC at time t – 1). For these individuals, this addition resulted in 
good fit. Finally, for the remaining five individuals, the autoregressive model did not show good 
fit, and modification indices did not suggest that cross-lagged regression parameters would 
improve fit. Parameters for final models can be found in Table 1. 
Thus, results suggested that SCC predicted impatience 15 minutes later, but only in some 
participants; in other participants, impatience predicted SCC 15 minutes later, but not vice versa. 
Finally, there were many participants for whom SCC and impatience had no significant lagged 
relationship. There was also considerable heterogeneity in the contemporaneous connections 
between SCC and impatience. Although the mean within-person correlation was small (r = .05), 
there were several individuals with strong, statistically significant correlations. Some of these 
correlations were positive, and some were negative. In short, results revealed substantial 
heterogeneity across individuals in the form, direction, and sign of the dynamic relationships 
between SCC and impatience. This general result provides preliminary support for the notion 
that different theories of how SCC relates to self-regulation may be true, but in different 
individuals; in some people, SCC may function as a resource, enabling adaptive self-regulation, 
whereas in others, SCC may be the product of well-regulated emotional experience.  
 However, because the data collected in Study 1 covered only a short amount of time 
(usually two consecutive days), we were unable to tell whether these models represent patterns 
that are characteristic of individuals or, on the other hand, temporary configurations of the 
dynamics between SCC and impatience that change over time. This question was the focus of 
Study 2.  
Study 2 
The purposes of Study 2 were 1) to replicate and extend the results of Study 1 and 2) to 
investigate the stability within individuals of dynamic process-models describing impatience and 
self-concept clarity states. To do the latter, we employed a “measurement burst” design 
(Nesselroade, 1991), in which participants completed two discrete rounds of smartphone surveys. 
These bursts were separated by one month. We aimed to determine how many participants’ 
models would change from one month to the next, to characterize the general extent of model 
change across this interval, and to investigate the correlates of changes in these models. We had 
no a priori expectation for the stability of dynamic factor models, as (to our knowledge) the 
current paper is the first study to examine this question using the current variables and 
timeframe.  
 In order to allow for a greater breadth of models, which would facilitate the detection of 
heterogeneity across individuals and change across time, we added a third variable to our ESM 
protocol: state negative affect. Negative affect (NA) has important longitudinal relations with 
self-concept clarity in daily diary studies (Ayduk et al., 2009; Nezlek & Plesko, 2001) and also 
has a close connection with impatience and related states such as “searching boredom” (Goetz et 
al., 2014; Koff & Lucas, 2011; McLeish & Oxoby, 2007).  
Method 
Participants were 36 undergraduate students at the same university as in Study 1, and recruitment 
method was identical to that of Study 1. Participants attended an initial lab session to complete a 
baseline demographics questionnaire, receive instructions for completing mobile surveys, and 
pick dates for mobile survey completion. In addition, participants completed a stressors survey, 
consisting of a checklist of stressors that were a current concern for them (roommate issues, 
financial troubles, academic stress, stress related to extra-curricular activities, sense of belonging 
at the university, stress related to their social life, and problems with motivation/procrastination). 
They were also asked to rate their current level of stress related to these domains and their 
overall level of stress on a sliding scale from 0 (“Extremely low”) to 100 (“Extremely high”). As 
in Study 1, participants were asked to complete 64 mobile surveys during the first ESM burst. 
Because of the popularity of the 15-minute interval in Study 1, this schedule was adopted for 
every participant in Study 2 (surveys every 15 minutes for sixteen hours, split into two blocks). 
After about one month, these participants were contacted by email and asked to return to the 
laboratory, where they completed a second, updated survey of current stressors and chose new 
dates for a second burst of 64 ESM surveys.  
Fifty-seven individuals (Mage = 18.9, age range = 18-24 years) enrolled in the study. Of 
these, 34 were women and 22 men; one participant declined to select a gender. Five participants 
(9%) reported their race as Black, seven (12%) as Asian/Pacific Islander, 40 (70%) as White, and 
five (9%) as more than one race (as in Study 1, participants could select more than one category). 
Of the 57 participants who enrolled, 52 began returning surveys for the first measurement burst. 
Five participants did not return enough data during the first burst to be usable in analyses. Of the 
remaining 47 participants, three were not invited to participate in the second burst: one because 
she was discovered to have participated in Study 1 the previous semester, and two because they 
completed burst-1 surveys on days that were too far apart (27 days in both cases). The remaining 
44 participants were invited to complete a second burst, and 39 participants responded to the 
invitation and began returning burst-2 surveys. Of these, one participant completed the required 
number of burst-2 surveys, but within only a few minutes rather than on the required 8-hour 
schedule. Two additional participants returned extremely stereotyped data for burst 2 (one 
returned mostly values of “2” on the 0-100 scale, and the other returned mostly values of “0” 
except for self-concept clarity, which was mostly “100”). The remaining 36 participants’ burst-1 
and burst-2 data, comprising 4,544 surveys in total, were submitted to analyses. As in Study 1, 
no demographic variable predicted attrition from enrollment to completion of burst-2 surveys, 
although men dropped out marginally more often than women, χ2(1) = 2.95, p = .09, ϕ = .23 (all 
other p-values > .25). Compliance with Study 2 was similar to Study 1. The 52 participants who 
returned at least one survey for burst 1 returned a median of 63 surveys of the requested 64 (M = 
61.27, SD = 8.54). The 39 of these who began returning burst-2 surveys also returned a median 
of 63 surveys (M = 63.13, SD = 4.80). 
ESM surveys consisted of the single SCC and impulsivity items used in Study 1, with a 
change in the prompt in order to reduce any ambiguity about the timing of the states being 
measured and to capture the immediate state of these variables for the participant (“Right now, I 
feel like I have a clear sense…”; “Right now, I feel impatient”). In addition, four negative affect 
(NA) items were chosen to exemplify both high arousal (stressed, worried) and low arousal (sad, 
lonely) facets of NA (Feldman, 1995) and to capture the typical momentary experience of 
negative affectivity among university students. As with the SCC and impatience items, NA items 
were delivered with the prompt, “Right now, I feel…” Items were rated on a 0-100 scale, ranging 
from “not at all” to “extremely.”  
As in Study 1, cubic spline interpolation was used to re-sample the multivariate time 
series data so that intervals between successive data points were equal. As a second preliminary 
step, each individual’s 4-variate NA time series was submitted to p-technique factor analysis in 
order to create optimal person-specific NA factors for use in the analysis of dynamic patterns 
among NA, SCC, and impatience. Nesselroade, Gerstorf, Hardy, and Ram (2007) refer to this 
step as the “idiographic filter,” as it helps to separate idiosyncrasies in the measurement of 
constructs from differences in the processes that mediate among constructs (Molenaar & 
Nesselroade, 2012). P-technique factor analysis was done separately for each burst. A one-factor 
model was adopted for each burst (with idiographic factor loadings for stressed, worried, sad, 
and lonely items) in order to facilitate comparison among bursts and participants and in order to 
avoid under-identification in measurement models with greater numbers of latent factors. Factor 
scores were computed for each burst according to the regression method. After these scores were 
obtained, time-series analysis was conducted on the 3-variate (SCC, impatience, and NA) time 
series. As in Study 1, a multivariate AR model was used as a baseline model, with SCC, 
impatience, and NA correlated at t – 1 and used to predict these states at time t. If fit was not 
satisfactory, cross-lagged regression parameters were added one-by-one until a well-fitting 
model was achieved. This process was conducted twice, once for each burst. 
Once well-fitting models were achieved for each burst, the amount of model change from 
burst 1 to burst 2 was quantified as the SRMR when one burst’s model was fit to the other 
burst’s data for that person. The SRMR was recently identified as a quantitative index of model 
misfit in structural equation models (Maydeu-Olivares, 2017), but because it does not 
compensate for the complexity of models, the more parsimonious model was tested on the other 
burst’s data (to avoid obscuring misfit through a high degree of model complexity).  
Results and Discussion 
Cross sectional examination of self-concept clarity’s relationship with criterion variables 
Mean scores for SCC, impatience, and negative affect variables were calculated for each 
participant. Correlation coefficients, means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum 
scores for all six variables can be seen in Table 2. Consistent with previous cross-sectional 
research, SCC showed negative interindividual correlations with negative affect and impatience 
(Bond, Ruaro, & Wingrove, 2006; Campbell et al., 1996; Ellison & Levy, 2012; Lear & Pepper 
2016; Lee-Flynn, Pomaki, DeLongis, Biesanz, & Puterman, 2011). Furthermore, participants’ 
scores at burst 1 were positively correlated with their scores at burst 2, showing stability of mean 
values from one month to the next.  
P-technique factor analyses 
Results from the preliminary p-technique factor analysis of the NA items in these 72 separate 
time series revealed substantial individual differences in the covariance of worry, stress, sadness, 
and loneliness states within persons. In general, a one-factor model showed good to excellent fit 
across participants. However, for 13 participants, a one-factor model contained negative error 
variances in one of the two bursts, suggesting that this model was misspecified. For an additional 
seven participants, this problem held for both bursts. Examination of the original time series 
suggested that, in all of these cases, “stressed” was the only item with substantial variability 
(whereas the participants did not report much sadness, worry, or loneliness on these days). 
Therefore, the series of “stressed” values was used in the multivariate time series models for 
these cases; for all other participants, NA factor scores were used. Whether “stressed” scores or 
p-technique NA factor scores were used did not relate to the overall level of self-reported stress 
at either lab visit (burst 1: t[55] = .25, p = .80, 95% CI: -.15.59 to 12.09, d = .07; burst 2: t[33] = 
.66, p = .52, 95% CI: -8.98 to 17.50, d = -.23). 
Dynamic factor analyses 
Dynamic factor analyses revealed a similar picture as in Study 1: of the 36 burst-1 time series, 
eighteen were modeled with excellent fit by a multivariate autoregressive model. The remaining 
eighteen required a partial vector autoregressive model for adequate fit, and the cross-lagged 
regression parameters appearing in these models were diverse. At burst 2, cross-lagged 
parameters were somewhat more common, appearing in 25 of 36 models. Each of these 
parameters was present in roughly the same number of models; the least common, appearing in 
11 models, was the parameter in which impatience was regressed onto negative affect at the 
previous occasion, and the most common (in which negative affect was regressed on impatience 
at the previous occasion) appeared in 15 models. Thus, results provide a conceptual replication 
of the results of study 1, in that links between SCC and criterion variables were heterogeneous in 
form, direction, and sign.  
Month-to-month stability in dynamic factor models 
The average SRMR when one month’s model was applied to the other month’s data for that 
person was .09, a value close to widely used cutoffs for adequate fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Thus, 
some participants’ models remained relatively consistent across bursts, whereas for others, there 
was substantial incongruity between bursts. In addition, there was substantial variability in the 
SRMR value across participants (SD = .04), which also suggests that some participants changed 
more than others. A qualitative comparison of good-fitting models across bursts showed that 
only four participants out of the 36 showed structurally identical models from one month to the 
next (Table 3), with some individuals changing only slightly in terms of model parameters and 
parameter values, and some individuals changing a great deal. Two individuals’ burst-1 and 
burst-2 models are presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
We further investigated the extent of model change by comparing model parameters 
across bursts. This is particularly important because some apparent changes between bursts may 
have been due to sampling error, given the relatively small number of observations upon which 
these models are based (k = 64). In order to characterize the extent to which imprecision in 
parameter estimates contributed to the picture of model change in Table 3, we examined how 
many parameter estimates in burst-2 models were within the 95% confidence intervals around 
the corresponding parameter estimates for the same person at burst 1. Excluding parameters 
involving NA when the measurement model for NA changed between bursts, the parameter 
“match” ranged from 0% to 67% across participants. An average of 25.1% of the parameters in 
burst 2 were within the confidence intervals around the corresponding parameters in burst 1. 
Thus, 75% of parameters had changed to a degree that was not accounted for by sampling error.  
Differences in measurement models for NA may have also accounted for some month-to-
month differences in the models’ structure. Because 14 individuals had p-technique factor 
models for NA at one burst, but NA characterized entirely by “stress” in the other burst, their 
overall model change might have been due in part to this difference. Therefore, we also 
considered whether model change was an artifact of changes in the measurement model of NA 
between bursts. Individuals whose measurement models changed did not show more overall 
model change (M = .085, SD = .04) than those whose measurement models did not change (M = 
.085, SD = .03), t(34) = .034, p = .97, 95% CI: -.03 to .03, d = .01. Finally, the length of the 
interval between bursts was not related to the extent of model change, r(34) = .259, p = .13, d = 
.54, 95% CI: -0.076 to 0.541.1  
Stress change as a correlate of model change 
On average, a similar amount of “overall stress,” as reported in lab visits before the initiation of 
ESM sampling, was evident for participants before burst 1 (M = 51.53, SD = 21.20) and before 
burst 2, one month later (M = 56.44, SD = 21.66), t(42) = 1.69, p = .098, d = .23, but there were 
ample differences in individuals’ stress change. We examined changes in self-reported “overall 
stress,” as reported in lab visits before the initiation of ESM sampling, as a correlate of model 
changes. Stress change was related to model change: the more individuals’ overall stress level 
changed from one month to the next, the more their dynamic factor models changed as measured 
by the SRMR, r(33) = .474, p = .004, d = 1.08, 95% CI: 0.168 to 0.697. Figure 3 shows the 
relation between these two variables. This correlation did not appear to result from stress-related 
changes in model complexity, as the amount of stress participants were experiencing was not 
related to the complexity of their models (as measured by the number of parameters) at burst 1, 
r(34) = -.056, p = .75, 95% CI: -.377 to .277, d = .11, or at burst 2, r(33) = -.137, p = .43, 95% 
CI: -.449 to .205, d = .27.  
General Discussion 
Considered together, the results of the two studies suggest differences, both between and within 
persons, in the dynamic patterns among momentary self-concept clarity, impatience, and 
negative affect. Results of both studies suggest that substantial variability exists in whether 
relationships between state SCC, state impatience, and state negative affect exist, and if so, in the 
direction and sign of these relationships. Most relevant for theories of SCC, this variable 
predicted impatience and negative affect states for some participants, supporting the theory that 
SCC can serve as a resource enabling people to better regulate their behavior and emotions 
(Campbell et al., 1996). For others, state NA or impatience predicted state SCC, suggesting that 
SCC might be the outcome of behavioral and emotional experience for them (Bem, 1967; 
McConnell, Rydell, & Leibold, 2002; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995). Thus, overall results 
support both theories of SCC’s relation to emotion and behavior regulation, but for different 
individuals. On the other hand, in many individuals no short-term relationship between SCC and 
impatience, or between SCC and negative affect, was observed. These results are not consistent 
with any theory of SCC and suggest that nomothetic findings of relationships between SCC and 
self-regulation variables may not represent the “general” dynamics of SCC (in the sense that a 
general model would apply to all individuals). This is because these models represent averages 
across individuals for whom SCC has a strong role in self-regulation and individuals for whom 
SCC is largely unconnected to self-regulation.  
One possible explanation for this heterogeneity is that it reflects diversity of self-concept 
among the participants. For example, negative affect and impatience might be congruent with 
some individuals’ self-concepts, incongruent with other individuals’ self-concepts, and irrelevant 
to the self-concepts of others. Self-concept clarity might then increase with negative affect and 
impatience in the first group, decrease in the second, and be unrelated to these variables in the 
third. This proposition awaits further study. Another possible explanation for the positive SCC-
impatience and SCC-NA links, which were unexpected based on prior theory, is that a feeling of 
negative affect or impatience may sometimes result when an individual is engaged in a task that 
is not congruent with his or her self-concept and is thus eager to switch to a preferred activity. In 
these instances, their self-concept might be easily called to mind and relatively clear, even as 
they feel impatient or anxious. A third possibility is that NA or impatience initially leads to 
decreases in SCC, but these decreases are followed by explicit or implicit compensatory 
processes (e.g., Dewall et al., 2011; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 
2007), so that SCC appears increased for some participants after a 15-minute interval. Because 
the speed of such processes is unknown (and may itself even vary among participants), future 
research with different sampling intervals will be needed to investigate these more complicated 
hypothetical dynamics. 
Study 2 showed that the patterns describing the covariation of SCC, NA, and impatience 
were somewhat fluid from one month to the next. The changes in these patterns across this 
period did not appear to be the result of random variation, measurement error, or an artifact of 
data processing or modeling. Instead, the extent of the changes varied along with the amount of 
self-reported stress change over this interval. Thus, we construe these patterns as meaningful and 
the changes as examples of “lawful discontinuity” (e.g., Belsky & Pensky, 1988) in the dynamic 
relationships among SCC, impatience, and negative affect.  
In other papers using “measurement burst” designs (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2011; 
Sliwinski, Almeida, Smyth, & Stawski, 2009), which mostly concern changes in intraindividual 
patterns that take place over years or decades as individuals age, changes across bursts are often 
interpreted as natural maturation. Indeed, most longitudinal research on SCC to date has operated 
on this timescale; accordingly, changes in relations between SCC and other variables in these 
studies are interpreted as indications of gradual processes of identity and personality 
development (Lodi-Smith & Crocetti, 2017). However, the relatively brief window between 
bursts in the current study, along with the fact that the participants were not mature adults but 
mostly students in their first year of college, suggests a different interpretation for the current 
results. We think that these patterns may represent temporary “snapshots” of the dynamics 
among SCC, NA, and impatience. That is, the dynamic factor models do not characterize stable 
SCC-behavior and SCC-emotion relations but rather a fluid, flexible organization that is possibly 
related to salient environmental factors. The fact that the extent of changes correlated with 
changes in stress level supports this interpretation. We might also speculate that a given 
individual might oscillate among a limited set of different patterns according to the relative 
presence or absence of particular environmental characteristics. These propositions await further 
study. 
A few limitations of the current set of studies deserve mention. One limitation is that, 
given the idiographic nature of the analyses, results cannot be assumed to apply to a broader 
population of individuals. We consider this to be a considerable strength, however, as the results 
illustrate the extent to which nomothetic research on SCC dynamics may not itself apply at the 
individual level. Another potential limitation is the frequency of the observations taken during 
ESM sampling. Although the current study used a relatively high-frequency sampling design 
compared to other ESM studies (most participants returned surveys every 15 minutes in Study 1, 
and all participants did so in Study 2), it is possible that important processes among self-concept 
clarity, impatience, and negative affect occur at a higher frequency and thus were missed (or that 
lagged relations at a higher frequency were misinterpreted as contemporaneous relations). There 
is also the possibility that sampling participants as frequently as we did could have limited their 
participation in identity-relevant activities or led to reactivity as they began to anticipate or be 
influenced by the measurement protocol. A third limitation concerns measurement. SCC and 
impatience states were measured with one item each, which certainly limits their reliability. 
There is a well-recognized tradeoff in ESM studies between accurate measurement and 
participant burden (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Shiffman 
et al., 2008), and we chose to err on the side of lowering burden (and thus increasing ecological 
validity). This approach is consistent with prior studies on state SCC, which have often used one-
item SCC measures (Ayduk, Gyurak, & Luerssen, 2009, Study 2; Scala et al., 2018; Schwartz et 
al., 2011). However, multi-item measures of these constructs would certainly be desirable. 
Fourth, dynamic factor modeling assumes “weak stationarity” of the time series data (Molenaar, 
1985), or the equality across the survey period of the means and of the covariances between 
equally-spaced observations. We have no reason to believe that this assumption was violated, 
especially as most participants completed their 64 surveys within a roughly 36-hour period of 
time. However, as Study 2 showed that these models do change from one month to the next, 
shifts in these parameters within a 36-hour period cannot be ruled out. Finally, although these 
models can show (through the presence of cross-lagged parameters) whether one variable is a 
Granger cause of another for a given person (Granger, 1969), we could not show causal 
influences in a strict sense in the current study. Doing so may require an experimental design. 
It would be particularly helpful at this stage to investigate specific correlates of different 
dynamic factor models, whether between different individuals or at different times for a single 
individual. It is not uncommon for heterogeneity in person-specific models of longitudinal data 
to go unexplained (e.g., Burg et al., 2017), and it is difficult to select potential static moderator 
variables a priori given the shared variance among measures of stress, depression, anxiety, well-
being, and the like (Tennen & Affleck, 2002). However, we find the multivariate nature of the 
current investigation to be a considerable strength, as the results easily generate further 
theorizing. In addition, it would be beneficial to determine the content of the self-concept for 
each individual participant. Doing so would allow researchers to examine whether fluctuations in 
thoughts, feelings, or behaviors relevant to each individual’s self-concept would predict changes 
in their SCC, as well as test whether relationships exist between certain self-concept content and 
specific models of self-concept clarity’s relationships with behavioral and emotion constructs. In 
planning future research, studies employing an experimental design in conjunction with ESM 
should be considered. This design would give the researcher the ability to manipulate SCC 
(Boyce, 2008; Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1993), or other emotion and behavior variables to more 
directly assess the causal relationship between SCC and various constructs.  
It would also be very important to replicate the current results in populations other than 
undergraduate students. Many undergraduates are at an age of rapid development of self-concept 
and self-regulation abilities (Lodi-Smith & Crocetti, 2017). This may mean that the study of the 
connections between self-concept clarity and other important variables is particularly relevant 
and important in this population. However, this may also mean that the dynamic connections 
between self-concept clarity and emotion or behavior may be different in other populations, just 
as trait self-concept clarity has different implications for individuals in different cultures 
(Campbell et al., 1996). Studies of SCC dynamics in groups with different ages, ethnicities, and 
socioeconomic characteristics would be particularly desirable given the limited range of these 
variables in the current sample, and indeed in the extant SCC literature in general.    
Overall, results suggested that there exists substantial variability among individuals in the 
kinds of parameters required to describe the covariance of their self-concept clarity and 
impatience states. The heterogeneity of these models is also evident from the diversity in the 
direction and size of model parameters. This in turn suggests that a single model does not 
describe the dynamic relations between these variables equally well for all persons. Furthermore, 
lack of model stability from month to month indicates that a single model does not adequately 
describe one individual at all times. Thus, we believe the most plausible explanation for our 
results is that these models represent temporary states of a dynamic functional relationship 
between SCC, NA, and impatience. As a consequence, interpreting groupwise models of the 
relationships between SCC and putatively related correlates as indications of general 
psychological processes that hold at the within-person level, or indeed assuming that within-
person models represent processes that are stable over time, would be ill-advised. We believe the 
results highlight the importance of examining self-concept clarity from a longitudinal and 
person-specific perspective. 
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Table 1 
Parameter Estimates for 41 Participants’ Time-Series Models (Study 1) 
 Parameter 
Participant ψ βII βSS βIS βSI 
1 0.14 0.05 0.33** - - 
2 0.02 0.25 0.19 -0.15 - 
3 0.18 -0.05 0.52*** - - 
4 0.58*** 0.75*** 0.30** 0.13 0.38** 
5 0.29* 0.32** 0.23 0.25*  
6 -0.19 0.37** 0.35** - - 
8 -0.18 0.58*** 0.33* - - 
9 0.01 0.32** 0.35** - 0.25* 
10 -0.11 0.25* 0.15 0.20  
11 0.05 0.51*** 0.54*** - - 
13 -0.07 0.26* 0.41** - - 
14 0.35* 0.32* 0.90*** 0.17 0.10* 
16 0.05 0.40*** 0.43*** - -0.25* 
17 -0.18 0.24 0.39*** - -0.20 
18 0.10 0.40** 0.39** - - 
19 -0.22 0.70*** 0.36** - - 
20 0.48** 0.00 0.37*** - - 
21 0.15 -0.06 0.26* - - 
23 0.13 0.33* 0.12 - - 
24 0.09 -0.02 0.40** - - 
25 -0.40** 0.06 0.16 - - 
33 0.24 0.46*** 0.33** - - 
34 -0.11 0.51*** 0.39** - - 
39 -0.01 0.47*** 0.44*** - - 
40 -0.10 0.58*** 0.58*** - - 
41 0.06 0.29* 0.34** - - 
43 -0.05 0.53*** 0.68*** - -0.18* 
44 0.19 0.44*** 0.22 0.21 - 
45 -0.12 0.57*** 0.32* - - 
46 0.56*** 0.40*** -0.01 - 0.31* 
47 0.26 0.34** 0.36** - 0.24* 
49 -0.28 0.09 0.50*** - - 
51 0.13 -0.09 0.41*** - 0.25* 
52 0.16 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.21 - 
53 0.06 0.60*** 0.41*** - - 
54 -0.12 0.61*** 0.63*** - - 
55 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.26 - 
59 -0.31* 0.61*** 0.12 - - 
61 -0.19 0.19 0.11 - - 
63 -0.11 0.15 0.48*** - - 
66 0.17 0.19 0.19 - - 
Note. ψ = correlation of impatience and self-concept clarity at time t - 1. βII = autoregression 
relating impatience at time t - 1 to impatience at time t.   βSS = autoregression relating self-
concept clarity at time t - 1 to self-concept clarity at time t.  βIS = cross-lagged regression relating 
self-concept clarity at time t - 1 to impatience at time t. βSI = cross-lagged regression relating 
impatience at time t - 1 to self-concept clarity at time t. Dashes indicate that the parameter was 
not required for good fit. Correlations between impatience and self-concept clarity residuals at 
time t were also included in all models but are omitted here. 


















Table 2  
 








Note. SCC = self-concept clarity. SDbetween = interindividual standard deviation; standard deviation of individual participant means 
from the group mean. SDwithin = intraindividual standard deviation; standard deviation of individuals’ responses from their mean, 
averaged across participants. Statistics for burst 1 are presented below the diagonal, and correlations for burst 2 are presented above 
the diagonal. Boldface correlation coefficients on the diagonal represent correlations between participants’ mean levels of each 
variable at burst 1 and mean levels at burst 2.  
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SDbetween SDwithin 
1 SCC .834** -.071 -.295 -.043 -.338* -.304 -.334* 57.59 26.58 8.38 
2 Impatient .111 .648** .482** .695** .618** .528** .303 23.68 17.39 12.12 
3 Sad -.271 .501** .548** .739** .806** .699** .438** 16.37 19.27 8.38 
4 Lonely -.189 .471** .931** .616** .628** .554** .195 14.63 17.15 8.24 
5 Worried -.337* .508** .610** .536** .617** .853** .479** 26.51 21.13 10.68 
6 Stressed  -.381* .584** .507** .478** .832** .549** .460** 36.61 20.79 13.47 
7 Baseline 
stress 
-.149 .146 .254 .124 .358* .283 .607** 52.04 21.70  
M 59.95 23.35 12.34 13.45 25.05 36.13 56.44    
SDbetween 23.81 17.99 12.52 14.61 17.57 18.80 21.66    
SDwithin 9.52 13.08 9.16 9.55 11.94 14.79     
Table 3 
 
Parameter Estimates for 36 Participants’ Time-Series Models (Study 2) 
 
  Parameter 
Part. burst ψSI ψSN ψIN βSS βII βNN βSI βSN βIS βIN βNS βNI 
1 1 -.22 -.23 .03 .63*** .48*** .82*** - - - - - - 
 2 -.19 -.41** .44** .31** .41*** .63*** - -
.43*** 
- - - - 
2 1 -.16 .14 .02 .04 .31* .66*** -.28* .22 - - - - 
 2 .28* .05 .18 .19 .22 .03 - - - - - - 
5 1 .54*** -.01 .14 .83*** .54*** .61*** - - - - - - 
 2 .06 -.39** -.07 .27* .21 .10 - - .24* - -.30* - 
8 1 -.14 -.28 .02 .33* .48*** .58*** - - - - - - 
 2 .22 .28* .45** .25* .05 .69*** - - - - - - 
9 1 .02 .11 .18 .45*** .04 .44*** - - - - - - 
 2 .25 -.29* -.08 .21* .24* .51*** - -
.47*** 
- - - - 
10 1 -
.60*** 
-.46** .57*** .61*** .49*** .56*** - - - - -.22* - 
 2 .15 .30* .42** .26* .68*** .65*** - - - - - - 
11 1 .06 .12 -.12 .24 .26* .67*** - - - - - - 
 2 .08 .02 .69*** .19 .67*** .08 - - - - - .56*** 
12 1 .33* -.08 .29* .09 .49*** .50*** .36** - - - - - 
 2 .20 .25 .62*** .20 .09 .02 .40** -.38** - - - - 
13 1 -.15 -
.50*** 
.50*** .33** .39*** .48*** - -.31* - .37** -.29** .20* 
 2 .13 -.44** -.13 .23* .32* .04 - - - - - - 
16 1 .08 .26 .28* .46*** .12 .52*** -
.44*** 
- - - - - 
 2 -.21 .16 -.37** .25* .13 .42*** -.19 -.30* - -.22 -.17 - 
17 1 .35* .06 -.16 .24* .61*** .48*** - - - - - - 
 2 -.06 .08 -.09 .22 .35** .17 -.22 - - - - -.25* 
18 1 -.27 -.06 .57*** .29* .68*** .51*** -.33* .27 -.16 .12 - .27* 
 2 .08 -.06 -.07 .06 .30* .38** - - - - - .20 
19 1 -.04 -.45** .23 .12 .00 .18 - - - - - - 
 2 -.14 .10 .41** .05 .23 .34** -.23 - - - - - 
  Parameter 
Part. burst ψSI ψSN ψIN βSS βII βNN βSI βSN βIS βIN βNS βNI 
20 1 -.05 -.11 .17 .33** .15 .52*** - - -.29* .28* - - 
 2 -.06 .17 .40** -.02 .14 .49*** - - - - - - 
24 1 -.26 -.30* .48** -.11 .18 .44*** - - - - - - 
 2 -.10 -.05 .29* .06 .15 .53*** - - - - - - 
25 1 -.12 .06 .10 .03 .52*** .25* - - - - - - 
 2 .22 .30* .43** .07 .08 .53*** - .36** - - - - 
26 1 .36* .49** .30 .25 .20 .35* - .34* - .38** .34* - 
 2 .66*** .28 .15 .54*** .21 .19 - - .44** - - - 
27 1 .04 .02 .09 -.05 .52*** .18 - -.25 - -.16 - - 
 2 -.22 -.43** .24 .28* .29* .60*** - - - - - -.20* 
28 1 -.07 .05 .18 -.09 .39** .44*** - - - - - - 
 2 .28* -.27 -.22 .42*** .32** .41*** - - - - -.28* - 
29 1 -.21 .02 .66*** .33** .50*** .19 .62*** -
.61*** 
.18* .35** - .54*** 
 2 -.38** -.33* .70*** .47*** .44*** .44*** - - -.23* - - .38** 
30 1 -.19 -.30* .57*** -.05 .23 .91*** - -.32* -.32** .33* - - 
 2 .28* -.11 .34* .05 -.17 .39** - - - - - -.26* 
31 1 .16 .36** .15 .31* .20 .28* -.19 -.21 - - .33** - 
 2 .20 .32* .13 .23 .02 .20 -.32* - - .21 .43*** - 
33 1 -.45** .07 .51*** .18 .15 .39*** - - - - - - 
 2 .21 -.06 .55** .49*** .19 .72*** - - - .43** - - 
35 1 -.06 .00 .11 .34** .22 .46*** - - - - - - 
 2 -.16 -.36* .34* .28* .38** .43*** - - - - - - 





.80*** .27* .39*** .62*** - -.37** - .51*** - .31*** 
38 1 .32* .06 .10 .16 .17 .24 - - - - - - 
 2 .07 .00 .18 .27* .22 .41*** -.24 - - - - - 
41 1 .08 -.10 .61*** .50*** .27* .27* - - - - - - 
 2 -.21 -.49 .35 .64*** .58*** .67*** - - - - -.19 - 
43 1 .32* -.13 .06 .40*** .07 .32* - - - - - - 
 2 .07 -.34* .32* .74*** 
74 
.28* .55*** - - - .25* - - 
  Parameter 
Part. burst ψSI ψSN ψIN βSS βII βNN βSI βSN βIS βIN βNS βNI 
46 1 .03 .04 .18 -.05 .16 .24 - - - - - - 
 2 -.16 -.32* -.06 .84*** .17 .28* -.15* - - - -.20 - 
49 1 -.17 -.19 .58*** .63*** .12 .27* -.23* - - - - - 
 2 -.04 -.24 .04 .09 .39** .40*** - - - - - - 
50 1 -.31 .15 .41 .26* .05 .75*** - - -.19 .35** -.23** - 
 2 .59*** -.11 .24 .29** .33** .17 - - - - - - 
53 1 -.23 -.21 -.02 .00 .09 .73*** - - - - .24* - 
 2 .03 -.04 -.10 .29* .06 .33** - - - - - - 
54 1 .36* -.04 .20 .52*** .16 .74*** - - .27* - - - 
 2 .09 -.12 .37** .57*** .31** .61*** - - -.26* - -.23* - 
55 1 -.31* .18 .17 .49*** .41*** .64*** - - - - - - 
 2 -.09 .19 .21* .79*** .53*** .79*** - - - - - - 
63 1 .10 -.32* -.08 .28* .05 .71*** - - .51*** -.26* .20 - 
 2 .11 .18 -.12 .41*** .44*** .46*** - - - - - -.25* 
66 1 -.09 .12 .44** -.12 .20 .15 - - - - - - 
 2 -.02 .27* .31* .34** .39*** .73*** - - .31** - - - 
Note. ψSI = correlation of impatience and self-concept clarity at time t - 1. ψSN = correlation of negative affect and self-concept clarity 
at time t - 1. ψIN = correlation of impatience and negative affect at time t - 1. βSS = autoregression relating self-concept clarity at time t 
- 1 to self-concept clarity at time t. βII = autoregression relating impatience at time t - 1 to impatience at time t. βNN = autoregression 
relating negative affect at time t - 1 to negative affect at time t. βSI = cross-lagged regression relating self-concept clarity at time t to 
impatience at time t – 1. βSN = cross-lagged regression relating self-concept clarity at time t to negative affect at time t – 1. βIS = cross-
lagged regression relating impatience at time t to self-concept clarity at time t – 1. βIN = cross-lagged regression relating impatience at 
time t to negative affect at time t – 1. βNS = cross-lagged regression relating negative affect at time t to self-concept clarity at time t – 
1. βNI = cross-lagged regression relating negative affect at time t to impatience at time t – 1. Dashes indicate that the parameter was not 
required for good fit. Correlations between impatience, negative affect, and self-concept clarity residuals at time t were also included 
in all models but are omitted here. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure captions. 
 
Figure 1. Dynamic factor models describing the relationship between self-concept clarity, 
impatience, and negative affect, simultaneously and at successive time points, for participant #12 
in September and October 2016 (structural model only). Numbers represent completely 
standardized maximum likelihood parameter estimates.  Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant 
parameters retained in the final model (p > .05).  SCC = self-concept clarity; IMP = impatience; 
NA = negative affect. Interval between t – 1 and t is 894s for September and 898s for October.  
* p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001. 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic factor models describing the relationship between self-concept clarity, 
impatience, and negative affect, simultaneously and at successive time points, for participant #33 
in October and November 2016 (structural model only). Numbers represent completely 
standardized maximum likelihood parameter estimates.  Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant 
parameters retained in the final model (p > .05).  SCC = self-concept clarity; IMP = impatience; 
NA = negative affect. Interval between t – 1 and t is 922s for October and 970s for November.  
* p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001. 
 
Figure 3. Scatter plot relating change in the amount of stress from one month to the next to 








1 Most individuals took exactly four (n = 9) or five (n = 10) weeks in between bursts, but there was a fair 
amount of variability around these two modes due to scheduling eccentricities (SD = 6.24 days, range = 
21 days to 49 days). 
                                               
